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How important is Education for Getting 





The impact of education on the process of development relies crucially on 
what can be assumed about the way it is rewarded.  Standard human capital 
theory assumes diminishing marginal returns to education.  The purpose of 
this paper is to examine the empirical relevance of this assumption. We find 
that the standard approach to estimating this relation is not well supported 
by virtually all of the available evidence for South Africa.  Indeed, the 
marginal rate of return to education is extremely high for tertiary levels of 
education and small (approaching zero) for lower levels of education.  If 
human capital accumulation is an important determinant of wealth 
accumulation, this implies that educational reforms in the form of small 
policy interventions will not have any significant impact on the distribution 
of income and wealth, as long as key features of labour markets that govern 





The relevance of education for the process of development relies crucially 
on what can be assumed about the way it is rewarded.  In a recent survey of 
1300 school students between the ages of 13-18, over 90% agreed with the 
statement that “To get ahead in South Africa, one must have a good 
education” (Burns, 2003).  That young people believe this is unsurprising, 
given that much of the social and political rhetoric surrounding issues such 
as poverty focus on the importance of effort and ability in overcoming one’s 
circumstances.  But there is another way in which their response could be 
read: to get ahead in life, simply having some education is insufficient.  One 
either has to have a great deal of education (or a great deal of money).  But 
this is at odds with the standard human capital representation of how 
education is rewarded.  The theoretical literature in economics now contains 
two widely different views of this process.  What can be termed as the 
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Walrasian approach adopts the view that human capital, like physical 
capital, exhibits diminishing returns at the margin.  Typically in this world 
view, initial conditions do not matter.  The so-called concavity in the return 
structure of education ensures that private incentives for the acquisition of 
education exist so that all individuals, even the extremely poor, will 
eventually acquire enough education, reap the associated rewards and escape 
poverty.  
 
But what if Burns’ high school students are right, that education only matters 
if one acquires more than an average level of attainment?  In other words, 
what if the rate of return to education is convex?  A broad range of 
theoretical models developed over the last 20 years shows that when the 
return structure to education is such that it only matters if one acquires a 
great deal of it, initial conditions can come to play a huge role in who gets 
ahead and who languishes behind, leading to  what economists term multiple 
equilbria.  Galor and Zeira (1993) for example model the effects of human 
capital accumulation on the evolution of income distribution among 
dynasties, by assuming the existence of both imperfect credit markets and 
indivisibilities in education (i.e., a non-convexity, or discontinuity, in the 
production technology of human capital).  This assumption is reflected in a 
strong non-linear pattern in the returns to education.  If one does not possess 
sufficient wealth for the “minimum investment” necessary to acquire 
education, and if the cost of borrowing is too high, one will remain 
unskilled, uneducated and poor.  Those with higher wealth will be able to 
invest in education, reap the higher returns and will remain wealthy.  Rich 
and poor dynasties emerge and the unequal distribution of wealth persists.  
This is bad news for textbook economics, as it implies that individuals can 
persist in poverty indefinitely even in the presence of public policy designed 
to achieve the opposite. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relevance of 
assumptions about the way in which education is rewarded in the case of 
South Africa by asking: how large are the pecuniary benefits of education, 
and is the available evidence consistent with the view that the returns to 
education diminish at the margin? We find that the standard approach to 
estimating this relation is not well supported by virtually all of the available 
evidence for South Africa.  This is consistent with other emerging evidence 
on the private benefits of education that show sharp and robust convexities 
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in the return structure (see for example Card (1999) and Belzil and Hanson 
(2002)).    Indeed, the marginal rate of return (i.e., the rate of return to an 
additional year of education) is extremely high for tertiary levels of 
education and small (approaching zero) for lower levels of education.  Other 
factors such as school quality undoubtedly account for some of this, but 
there is evidence to suggest that controlling for these forms of bias would 
not eliminate the qualitative finding.  If convexities remain a robust feature 
of the data and if human capital accumulation is an important determination 
of wealth accumulation, educational reforms in the form of small policy 
interventions can be expected to have a negligible impact on the distribution 
of income, education and wealth.  Indeed, what is needed are large policy 
interventions or simultaneous focus on policies designed to alter the manner 
in which the labour market rewards education.  
 
The paper is organised as follows.  In section 2, we present a standard 
analytical framework for measuring the returns to education before turning 
to a brief review of all the existing evidence we have been able to locate on 
the subject (that is comparable and representative in some meaningful sense) 
in section 3. We then turn to our own estimates beginning in section 4, with 
a discussion of the data we use, followed by a presentation and discussion of 
our own results in section 5.  In section 6, we offer some qualifications to 
our findings, before concluding in section 7.  
 
 
2. Measuring Returns to Education 
 
One approach to measuring the pecuniary returns to education is to calculate 
the so-called internal rate of return which is simply the discount rate that 
equates the present value of costs incurred and the opportunity cost of 
earnings foregone whilst one is in school, to the present value of earnings 
arising from the additional education acquired.  A popular approximation to 
this measure, termed the Mincerian return after Jacob Mincer (1974), is 
given by the coefficient of the schooling term in a log-linear earnings 
function.  The basic idea in this model is to provide a choice-theoretic 
framework for the accumulation of human capital, where human capital is 
narrowly defined as one’s level of educational attainment.  The choice of the 
optimal level of education is made through a process of comparing the 
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present value of different income streams associated with different levels of 
schooling (Becker (1964), Hansen (1963), Mincer (1958), (1974), Ben-
Porath (1967)).  Under the assumption that the time span of earning life is 
fixed, an equilibrium condition is defined by setting the expected rate of 
return to schooling investments equal to the discount rate (i.e., the rate at 
which the individual discounts future benefits of going to school now, 
relative to the present benefit of working now instead of attending school).  
Formally, we can define the present value of an individuals lifetime earnings 
at the start of schooling as: 
 
 (1 )
s n t s n
s
s
yV y e dt e eβ β β
β
+ − − −= = −∫  (1) 
 
where y  refers to the income stream associated with s years of schooling, n  
is the length of working life, and β  is the rate of return to investment in 
schooling.  Likewise, we can define the present value of lifetime earnings in 
the absence of schooling to be 
 
 ( )0 00
0
(1 ) (1 )
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where α refers to the income stream associated with s years of schooling. 
Assuming that the only cost to schooling is forgone earnings and individuals 
do not earn while in school, then equating Vs to V0 establishes the first order 
condition for maximisation of lifetime earnings, and therefore the 














−  (3) 
 
Taking the natural logarithm and rearranging terms, we get, 
 
 ln lny sα β= +  (4) 
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This is the canonical earnings function usually attributed to Mincer (1974).   
Note that individual sub-scripts, though applicable, have been suppressed to 
reduce notational clutter. 
 
The constant term α accounts for expected earnings in the absence of other 
factors, where the other factors in this model, relate only to schooling.  The 
schooling coefficient β  is the marginal “private” rate of return on education.  
This coefficient is interpreted as the marginal internal rate of return on 
education where the costs of education are accounted for, both in terms of 
direct costs (tuition etc.), as well as indirect costs, in terms of earnings 
foregone during the time spent acquiring education (Rosen (1992)).   
 
Since earnings is also likely to be independently influenced by experience, 
(4) is conventionally augmented with a measure of “potential experience” to 
account for the importance of on-the-job learning. But because this proxy is 
measured with considerable error in cases where grade repetition is high and 
spells of unemployment are long (both of which are true for South Africa), 
we choose not to follow convention here.  Instead, we use age, as opposed to 
the more standard proxy for “potential experience” as is common in the 
literature on returns to education.   
 
 21 2ln lny S Age Age uα β ξ ξ= + + + +  (5) 
 
as our baseline earnings function, where the last term in the expression is 
simply a random shock, which is assumed to average out over the population 
(i.e., the mean is zero).  Several observations about (5) are worth drawing 
attention to:  First, while it is explicitly derived from a model where 
individuals choose the optimal level of schooling that maximises their 
utility, it could also be treated as a reduced form representation of an 
income-generating function.  Second, the (assumed) relation between log 
income and schooling is linear, implying that the rate of return to an 
additional year of education is the same for all individuals (less and more 
educated alike).  Third, a standard finding about the effects of age is that 
marginal increases in age lead to marginal increases in income, but these 
increases diminish as one gets older.  Thus, the age-earnings profile is said 
to be concave. 
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In what follows, we present estimates of (5) and then alter the model in 
several important ways.  One standard test of the hypothesis of non-linear 
returns to education is to re-write (5) so that  
 
 2 21 2 1 2ln lny s s Age Age uα β β ξ ξ= + + + + +  (6) 
 





β β∂ = +
∂  (7) 
 
Thus, an important implication of measuring the returns to education in this 
way is that the rate of return is now allowed to vary by level of education.  A 
sufficient test of the hypothesis that all individuals experience the same rate 
of return, independent of the level of education would be to find β2 to be 
insignificantly different from zero. 
 
Finally, we extend (6) even further to account for intercept effects of race, 
gender and location (all captured in the vector X shown in equation (8) 
below).  Moreover, to allow for the possibility that age does not operate 
independently of education, we also include age-education interaction terms.  
This controls for the differing average educational attainment of various age 
groups, and allows an evaluation of the rate of return of education, 
conditional on one’s age. In addition, we introduce a cubic polynomial in 
education, based on the notion that since we actually do not know the true 
functional form of the reward structure, it is appropriate to tease out the 
underlying functional form by introducing higher order polynomials in the 
spirit of a Taylor series approximation.  Thus (6) is transformed to: 
    
 ( ) ( ) ( )
2 3 2
1 2 3 1 2
2 3
1 2 3
ln lny s s s Age Age
Age s Age s Age s u
α β β β ξ ξ
δ δ δ
= + + + + + +
× + × + × + Ω +X  (8) 
 
We can therefore write the returns to education as: 
 
 2 21 2 3 1 2 3
ln 2 3 2 ( ) 3 ( )y s s Age Age s Age s
s
β β β δ δ δ∂ = + + + + × + ×
∂ (9) 
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How will rates of return to education affect inequality?  One standard 
measure of this is given by the coefficient of determination – the R2 – which 
measures the fraction of the variation in log earnings explained by the 
particular combination of explanatory variables in question.  In a model like 
(4) the R2 measure is a useful indication of the fraction of earnings inequality 
explained by schooling.  By taking variances of the basic earnings equation 
(4) we can also arrive at a measure of the distribution of earnings as a linear 
function of the distribution of schooling:    
   
 
( ) ( )
2
var var
var( ) var( ) 2 cov( , )
var( ) 2 var( ) 2 cov( , )
2 cov( , )
y s u
s u s u













Differentiating the resulting expression with respect to the rate of return, as 
shown in equation (10), we can derive an analytical expression that shows 
that inequality necessarily must increase when the rate of return increases, as 
long as there is a positive relationship between earnings and education.  If 
the variance decomposition were applied to (6), it would become obvious 




3. Existing Evidence 
 
The most influential work (from a policy perspective) on collating and 
comparing international estimates of the returns to education are the cross-
country analyses by Psacharopoulos (1973, 1985, 1994) and most recently, 
Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2002).  Over a period of 30 years, he has 
compiled and compared estimates of the rates of return to education for a 
vast number of countries – the latest review is for a sample of 98 countries 
covering all major geographic regions of the world.  The central claims of 
each of these studies has been that the returns to education, however they 
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may be measured, decline by level of education within countries, becoming 
less important over the course of economic development.  Table 1 
reproduces these results and purports to show this pattern for Mincerian rates 
of return, averaged over region.  Since countries in poorer regions trend to 
have higher rates of return coupled with lower average attainment figures, 
this (at least in the previous reviews) was taken as evidence that spending 
priorities of poor countries should focus on primary education.  However, 
more recent evidence (Bils and Klenov (1999), Psacharopoulos & Patrinos 
(2002)) does not show a consistent pattern of diminishing returns.  
Moreover, various problems plague this sort of analysis.  Differences 
abound in the type of data used, much of which is derived from employer 
surveys rather than household surveys.  Indeed, Bennel (1996) argues 
convincingly that much of the evidence presented for Sub-Saharan Africa in 
these reviews are of highly questionably quality and thus the enormous rates 
of return to primary schooling typically claimed, as evidence in table 2, 
cannot be treated as reliable.  These factors, coupled with the recent 
divergence in aggregate patterns, have highlighted the need for caution in 
interpreting evidence on rates of return to education, particularly in terms of 
their policy relevance. 
 
A common alternative approach, relied on heavily in macroeconomic policy 
debates about the role of education, is to study the so-called social rate of 
return.  The distinguishing feature of this method is to include some measure 
of social spending on education (or sometimes average attainment by type of 
education) in cross country growth regressions, aggregated at the country or 
regional level where per capita GDP (or some such aggregate measure of 
welfare) is the object of interrogation.  Table 3 shows an example of this 
from the reviews mentioned above.  Barring obvious problems with this 
approach1, the most recent evidence in favour of concavity in the returns to 
education is at best mixed.  For example, in the more recent review 
undertaken by Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2002), the pattern does no hold 
for the lesser-developed regions in Europe/ Middle East/ North Africa and 
                                                 
1 Growth accounting models of the returns to education are highly sensitive to the measure of 
welfare used – GDP per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity), unemployment rate, 
poverty rate, GINI coefficients – these are just a sampling of the available choices. Then there are 
questions of how to define education: if educational expenditures are used, how does one account 
for structural breaks in expenditure within countries? 
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for OECD countries.  Moreover it has also been agued that in the case of the 
Middle East and Africa in general, evidence in favour of social returns to 
education of any kind simply do not exist (Pritchett, 2001). 
 
These and other problems of aggregation (see Bennel, 1996) perhaps 
account for the much more guarded approach taken in the latest review by 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, with the authors themselves stating that these 
patterns should no longer be treated as prescriptions for policy – a statement 
quite at odds with the tone of earlier reviews.  Indeed, closer inspection of 
Psacharopoulos’ results shows that many findings are extremely dated and 
many countries are excluded from the analysis altogether.  Consideration of 
just a handful of these recent studies (all subject to peer review) reveals 
some interesting patterns.  Siphambe (2000) for example, finds that in 
Botswana, the Mincerian returns to primary schooling are quite small, 
followed by lower secondary, tertiary, and then upper secondary schooling.  
Skyt and Westergård (1998) find a similar result for Zambia for urban men 
and woman. Likewise, Teal (2001), Wahba (2000) and Appleton, Hoddinott 
and Mackinnon (1996) find evidence of strongly increasing private returns 
to education in Ghana, Egypt, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and Tanzania.   
 
Neither is the phenomenon peculiar to Africa.  Carnoy (1995) for example 
shows that a pattern of increasing returns emerges when studying changes in 
rates of returns over time for countries as diverse as the USA, Columbia, 
Hong Kong, Kenya and Korea.  He argues that in periods of rapid 
industrialization, combined with increased access to primary and secondary 
education, the rates of return to schooling appear to decline over time with 
the largest decreases affecting the returns to primary education.  On the 
whole, a strong pattern of increasing returns therefore emerges, with tertiary 
education ending up with the highest rates of return.2 
 
These broad results are also consistent with what is known about rates of 
return for South Africa. Table 4 summarises the key results of studies that 
have incorporated some form of education variable into semi-log earnings 
functions (appendix A provides more details on each of the studies 
                                                 
2 See also Card (1999) and Belzil and Hanson (2002) for more recent evidence on convexities. 
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considered3). The estimates presented in the table are derived from the listed 
studies by converting those estimates reported by the authors into a linear 
spline function (the most common approach used in the reviewed studies)4.  
The results are therefore to be interpreted as the average private rate of 
return to an additional year of primary, secondary or tertiary education.  We 
then take the average across the spline as an approximation to an ordinary 
least squares estimate of the Mincerian return.   
 
Several patterns emerge from comparing these studies.  First, in virtually 
every case considered, the returns to education are clearly increasing, by 
level of education5.  Second, in every study the returns to an additional year 
                                                 
3 The relevant studies are Mwabu and Shultz (1993), Rospabe (2001), Bhorat (2000), Michaud 
and Vencatachellum (2001), Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001), Lam (1999), Moll (1996), Hofmeyer 
(2001), Hosking (2001), Kingdon and Knight (1999), Erichsen and Wakeford (2001).  Earlier 
studies such as Joubert (1974), Archer and Moll (1980), and Pillay (1991) are not explicitly 
considered as all of these studies were not based on representative datasets.  
4 This was done so as to make estimates roughly comparable since some of the studies differed 
markedly in terms of the data, sampling algorithms, definitional conventions, and estimation 
techniques. For example, some studies explicitly separate out the effects of race and gender by 
estimating separate regressions for each of these catagories.  Still, other studies consider different 
forms of employment ranging from full time, part time, and self-employment, spanning formal 
and informal sector workers.    
 
5 Two exceptions to this finding are Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001), and Michaud and 
Vencatachellum (2001).  In the case of the latter study, the returns to education for union-
members are convex, whereas this is not the case for non-union members.  There are two 
probable reasons for this.  Firstly, the sample of non-unionised African males with tertiary 
education is particularly small. Secondly the regressions are run including a significant ‘skilled-
employment’ dummy.  This dummy is likely to be highly correlated with tertiary education and 
probably accounts for why the pattern does not emerge for this group.   
In the case of Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001), the authors use what they term a “three stage sample 
selection model” for which coefficients on the education splines are reported for each stage.  
They begin by estimating separate probit equations for labour market participation and 
employment. Using the estimated inverse of the Mills ratio computed in the second equation, they 
then proceed to estimate an earnings function.  They find that in the employment probit, the 
coefficients are as expected.  The spline for tertiary education is significant in influencing the 
probability of having a job and is much higher than for secondary and primary returns.  In the 
earnings equation, however, the coefficients on tertiary education are insignificant.  The authors 
comment that this implies that although tertiary education is important in raising the probability 
of employment, it is not relevant as a predictor of the level of earnings for Africans.  This result is 
in direct contrast with at least two other studies focusing on the sample of African individuals in 
nationally representative data sets, namely Moll (1996) and Keswell (2003). 
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of primary education are low and below 10%.  The median across studies is 
in fact a mere 4%.  Many authors have commented on reasons for the 
relatively low returns to primary education in South Africa.  Moll (1996) 
postulates that poor schooling quality for Africans is likely to be the major 
cause of low returns.  While this surely must be an important part of the 
explanation, in other work it has been shown that a large piece of the puzzle 
rests on understanding the changing racial patterns of rewards and returns in 
the labour market (Keswell, 2003). 
 
The above results suggest that the weight of the available evidence for South 
Africa at least does not support the long held view of diminishing returns to 
education.  However, owing to the various problems of comparability and 
interpretation across these studies, it is difficult to make a serious judgement 
about robustness of the evidence.  The literature reviewed here suggest 
strong reasons to expect convexities to be a robust phenomenon of the data, 
but this can only be rigorously established if many of the comparability 
problems highlighted above are dealt with in some systematic manner.  The 
remainder of the paper is devoted to dealing with some of these problems in 
the hope of being able to ascertain the robustness of the convexities result.  
Our approach is straightforward in the sense that we apply common 
definitions, functional forms and estimation techniques in estimating the 
returns to education, using on four nationally representative datasets for 





The data used in this paper are drawn from the Project for Statistics Living 
Standards and Development (PSLSD) conducted in 1993, the October 
Household Surveys (OHS) of 1995 and 1997, and the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS), conducted in September 20006.   
 
                                                 
6 Other available micro data was not used primarily for differences in data coverage and 
measurement.  For example, the OHS 1996 was excluded primarily due the nature of the income 
data which was only reported in intervals.  The 1996 sample is also least comparable with other 
data as its sample size is approximately half that of the other years of the OHS and its enumerator 
areas are based on a different sampling frame.  See also appendix B for more on this point. 
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In all surveys considered, the distribution of education is not systematically 
related to the non-reporting of incomes – those that did not report their 
income did not report statistically different levels of educational attainment 
from those who did report income.  This implies that the incidence of 
missing data for earnings is independent of a respondent’s schooling level.  
We therefore choose to ignore cases of missing data generally7. 
 
Table 5 shows the mean characteristics of the sample drawn from each of the 
four surveys to be used in the analysis to follow.  All estimates are for 
individuals and not households.  
 
We use age, as opposed to the more standard proxy for “potential 
experience” as is common in the literature on returns to education.  This is 
because factors such as grade repetition, low educational attainment, and job 
insecurity (problems which typify South Africa) will likely produce 
overestimates of the effect of potential experience.8  Table 5 shows that 
average age of all full time employees rises from about 36 years in 1993 to 
39 years in 2000.  The average age of those without any form of paid 
employment (i.e., the censored observations) remains fairly constant across 
the surveys at about 31 years, while mean educational attainment (measured 
as years of schooling attained) of the censored observations increases by 1 ½ 
years.  
 
Income earners are restricted to full time workers between the ages 15 – 65. 
Earnings are measured as gross monthly pay including overtime and 
bonuses9. Self-employment is excluded from the analysis as it is poorly 
                                                 
7 In the case of the October household surveys, one can do this with less confidence because the 
frequency of missing income data is potentially not exogenously determined in at least one 
known way: questionnaire designs, particularly of the most recent surveys, allowed respondents 
to report their income brackets as opposed to their actual income.  Thus, it becomes important to 
know if the complete distribution of incomes (which we have no precise way of knowing) is 
systematically different to the distribution of reported incomes. Appendix B details the manner in 
which we tried to address this problem. 
8 “Potential experience is usually proxied by the formula: Age – Years of Education – 6.  For 
obvious reasons, whenever self-selection of any kind is at work, this proxy is a poor measure of 
job tenure, on-the-job learning, and other such factors, about which “potential experience” is 
usually meant to shed light on. 
9 The choice of using monthly as opposed to hourly earnings is largely due to differences in the 
way this variable is measured across surveys.  As our sample of interest is limited to full time 
formal sector workers, we do not see this as particularly problematic.  Furthermore, if one 
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defined in both the PSLSD and the LFS thus rendering any meaningful 
comparisons of this group impossible.  Moreover, even in the absence of 
these problems, including these categories would compound the opposing 
effects of seasonality (where measurement error is systematic and therefore 
predictable) and inter-temporal fluctuations due to the transitory nature of 
many types of self-employment in the informal sector.   
 
Excluding these categories of paid employment has the consequence of 
overstating the implied degree of unemployment.  Thus, the fraction of the 
sample where individuals have zero earnings is best interpreted as the degree 
of censoring and not the rate of unemployment.  Appendix C provides 
further details of the construction of the dependent variable in the analysis to 
follow.  
 
Table 5 shows that the extent of censoring is substantially lower in 1995 
than in other years.   This necessitates that some systematic approach be 
adopted to account for this, if we are to make reliable comparisons across 
the various surveys.  The econometric literature is divided on precisely how 
to deal with this issue (see Madalla (1983) and Deaton (1997) for opposing 
views).  However, the practice of simply treating zeros as missing values 
(which all except one of the reviewed studies does) results in biased 
estimates (see appendix D).  Moreover including the zeros and not adjusting 
the estimator used can have consequences, especially if the goal is to 
compare estimates across surveys where the degree of censoring differs 
substantially. Since the degree of censoring in the 1995 OHS differs by a 
magnitude of 10-15% compared to the other surveys, the cross-sectional 
comparisons made in this paper depends crucially on a systematic treatment 
of this problem.  We therefore present estimates based on two different 
approaches –ordinary least squares (where no adjustments are made) and 
Tobit estimates (where we do adjust for the inclusion of the unemployed). 
Further details concerning this estimation technique are outlined in 
Appendix E.  The results are reported in tables 6-10. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
assumes that the pattern of hours worked over the lifecycle is fixed exogenously, it makes little 
difference what measure of earnings is used, be it hourly, weekly, monthly or annual.  (Willis, 
1986) 
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5. Empirical Estimates 
 
Tables 6 and 7 shows OLS and Tobit estimates of equation (5) – the 
standard Mincerian earnings function. Accounting for censoring, the rate of 
return to education for full time wage earners lies between 15–26 percent. 
The non-linear model (equation (6)) represented in tables 8-9 show that the 
Mincerian model does not fit the data well – the quadratic specification for 
education is highly significant for all years under consideration.  Both sets of 
results however, suggest remarkably higher rates of return at all levels of 
education than is typical (see section 3).  Several factors account for this.  
First, only full time wage earners are considered.  Second, owing to the large 
degree of censoring, the rate of return is overstated10.  Third, the results 
obscure the effects of race – i.e., in addition to the non-linear effects by 
education, a further dimension of (omitted) heterogeneity is the effect of 
race on the rate of return to education.  Indeed, further estimates (not 
reported here) indicate that race accounts for a substantial fraction of the 
large returns indicated in tables 6-9.  For example, when including race 
dummies, the estimated Mincerian rate of return in all years considered is 
less than half that indicated in tables 6-7.  Keswell (2003) considers this 
question in more detail and finds an extremely large increase in the racial 
income gap between Africans and whites emerges over the period 1993-
2000 – this increase being driven largely by a sharp increase in the rates of 
return accruing to whites.  
 
Tables 10 and 11 present estimates of the effect of a cubic polynomial in 
schooling (as in equation (8)) controlling for intercept differences by race 
and region, as well as slope differences in rates of return to education by 
age.  The results show a particularly robust fit of the cubic model – the 
coefficients on all the educations terms are significant in all years 
considered.  Note though that given the non-linearity introduced through 
schooling, the rates of return implied by these estimates are not obvious.  
However, by making use of equation (9) the marginal effect of education can 
                                                 
10 The consequence of including the zeros is to make the predicted earnings-education mapping 
steeper than it would otherwise be, if one were to use OLS.  The Tobit can be thought of as a 
intermediate estimate between the relatively flat fitted regression line that would result were the 
zeros excluded, and the relatively steep fit were the zeros included and estimated via ordinary 
least squares (notice that the estimated coefficients of the Tobit are consistently smaller than the 
corresponding OLS estimates). 
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then be calculated – though as is evident from resulting expression, the rate 
of return depends on one’s age and level of schooling.  Thus to find the 
actual rates of return we need to substitute in the relevant information for 
each individuals age and level of education.  Table 12 shows such a 
calculation for a 40 year old individual with 7, 10, 12 and 15 years of 
education respectively.  In order to facilitate comparison with the existing 
evidence, we need to also calculate the pseudo splines referred to earlier.  
The estimates referred to as “average returns” in table 12 show this 
calculation. The new evidence reported here is quite consistent with what 
was inferred from existing studies. Specifically, the average rate of return 
per year of primary schooling is exceptionally low, with a strong pattern of 
increasing returns present (consistent with the derived estimates from other 
South African studies summarised in table 4).  
 
An alternative way of depicting this finding is shown in figure 2.  This figure 
simply represents a plot of the fitted values generated by estimating equation 
(8) against the corresponding years of education for our sample of 
individuals in each dataset.  The slope of the plots reflect how predicted 
earnings change with each level of education (i.e., the flatter the slope at a 
particular point, the smaller the associated rate of return at that point).  Like 
the parametric estimates discussed above (table 12), it shows a sharply 
convex relationship between education and predicted earnings.  The huge 
returns to tertiary education are quite striking in each of the 4 datasets, as 
indicated by the large steepness of the slope of the fitted line.  Equally 
striking is the flatness of the slope of predicted earnings for virtually all of 
primary education, confirming the low (close to zero) returns that are 
generally suggested by the existing evidence (see table 4).    
 
An interesting finding is the apparent downward sloping portion of the fitted 
lines in figure 2.  This is quite a robust feature of the data.  While a 
substantial fraction of this effect is probably generated by reporting errors in 
schooling, if those individuals with only a few years of education are adults, 
this introduces the possibility that the apparently higher expected earnings of 
individuals with less than three years of education may have more to do with 
age or experience effects, rather than education. Setting aside the potential 
problems with the experience proxy, Using the PSLSD data, Hertz (2001) 
finds that controlling explicitly for potential years of experience eliminates 
the apparent trade-off between experience and schooling at the bottom of 
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education distribution.  We perform the same test for our two datasets in 
which the downward-sloping effect is most severe.  Figure 3 shows that this 
reverses the negative slope, but also serves to pronounce the sharpness of the 
convexity – the  returns are constant up until approximately 12 years, 
increase substantially around this point, and thereafter are fairly constant but 
at a much higher level, suggesting two regimes within the data.  Such a 
pattern might be described as “lumpy” or discontinuous.  For example, the 
pictures show that one could invest for 10 years, with practically zero 
marginal return, or invest for more than 13 years and receive a high return.  
Both figures 2 and 3 show that at least one of the preconditions for the 
generation of poverty traps (convex returns) might be a robust feature of the 
data, suggesting a strong causal role for education in the perpetuation of 
inequality (Ljungqvist (1993), Galor & Zeira (1993), Hertz (2001), 
Mookherjee and Ray (2002)). 
 
 
6. Some Qualifications 
 
Several forms of potential biases plague any estimate of the rate of to 
education.  These include the omission of ability, family background, school 
quality, as well as error stemming from the mis-measurement of the 
schooling variable itself.  Though no attempt is made to correct for any of 
these potential biases in the estimates we report (primarily because of the 
lack of adequate data on these variables in the sources we have used) it is 
worth briefly considering what is known about these effects elsewhere, and 
what can be inferred from the limited work in this area using South African 
data. 
 
Omission of “ability” from the earnings function is one potential cause of 
bias. If there is a positive correlation between education and ability, so that 
those who have greater ability tend to stay in schooling longer, then earnings 
that are attributed to higher levels of schooling may rather be a function of 
higher ability.  When ability is unobserved and omitted from earnings 
functions, the estimate of the rate of return to education will be biased 
upwards.  Attempts to quantify ability biases have used instrumental variable 
approaches and data on twins to control for ability differences (see 
Ashenfelter and Rouse (2000) and Bowles and Gintis, 2002)).  Another 
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approach is to attempt to control for “observable” ability using test scores 
such as IQ as a measure of cognitive ability.  Empirical evidence on the 
magnitude of ability bias measured in terms of (omitted effects of) test 
scores tends to suggest that it is relatively small, typically around 10-12 
percent (Griliches and Mason (1972), Card (2001)) with the direction of the 
bias sometimes being indeterminate (Griliches (1977)).  In a survey of 
studies on investments in education, Schultz (1988) places the figure as most 
likely falling between 5 and 15 percent.   
 
Little is known about this form of bias for South Africa owing to the lack of 
reliable data on measures of cognitive skill.  However, one recent estimate  
implies that the fraction of the rate of return to schooling accounted for by 
cognitive skill is about 33% for individuals with primary and secondary 
schooling, and about 6% for those with tertiary education (Moll, 1998).  This 
pattern suggests that although ability biases might be large compared to what 
is typically observed in richer countries (see for example Bowles and Gintis 
(2001)), the inclusion of cognitive skill as a proxy for ability will not have a 
marked impact on the convex nature of the returns to education.  Indeed, 
Moll’s (1998) results, while not representative, shows quite strong 
convexities even after controlling for reporting errors using robust 
estimators.11 
 
Omitting family background variables, such as parental education, may also 
result in biased coefficients, either due to the potential correlation between 
genetics and ability or through the possibility that wealthier and “better 
socially connected” parents will secure more education for their children, as 
well as high-paying jobs.  In a comprehensive review of recent studies of 
returns to education, Card (1999) concludes that the biases that arise in OLS 
estimates upon the inclusion of controls for family background (such as a 
parent’s or sibling’s education) are of a similar order of magnitude to the 
biases in OLS estimates that omit family background indicators altogether.  
This however, does not suggest that these factors are unimportant – parental 
                                                 
11 Molls estimates are based on a sample of 133 African male workers that have regular 
employment and from whom literacy test results were obtained.  This by itself does not render the 
estimates unreliable.  However, the literacy tests were only administered in 1 in 6 households 
visited, and of these, only a small fraction of the working sample was captured, thus rendering 
this group a non-random sample, even of African male workers that have regular employment.  
See Case and Deaton (1998) for more on this. 
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income and one’s neighbourhood of residence will be highly correlated with 
one’s own educational attainment (see for example Burns (2001)) and 
therefore might cause bias in the rate of return.  However, the opposing 
effects of the various forms of bias could mask both the overall importance 
of these variables, as well as their indirect operation made possible through 
the likely correlation between parental and off-spring characteristics in 
general.  Indeed, recent evidence suggests that the direct influence of these 
variables on an individual’s income generation is perhaps more important 
(see for example Bowles and Gintis (2002)).   
 
Finally, if there is a high correlation between the quality and quantity of 
education attained, and the quality variable is omitted from the earnings 
function, the estimated rate of return to education might be biased, though 
this depends largely on how quality is measured – measuring school quality 
in terms of the relationship between test scores and wage rates, for example, 
often does not give very different estimates of the return to education than if 
one were to exclude the measure altogether (Schultz (1988:590); Card and 
Krueger (1992:1)).  Research using other indicators of school quality 
however, such as teacher qualification and teacher-pupil ratios, suggests 
significant biases in estimated rates of return.   In a study of Brazilian males 
aged 15 to 35, Behrman and Birdsall (1983) use district-average teacher 
education as a proxy for schooling quality.  On comparing OLS estimates of 
standard earnings functions with estimates that include the omitted quality 
variable, they find substantial upward bias in the returns to education – on 
the order of about 75 percent.  Likewise, Card and Krueger (1992) find that 
in the USA, men schooled in states with higher quality education systems 
(measured by relative teacher pay, average term length, pupil-teacher ratios 
and the like), have greater returns to education.  Case and Yogo (1999) find 
some corroborative evidence of this for black South African males though 
little can be deduced about the magnitude of the bias involved owing to the 
approach used. 
 
Whereas omission of ability, family background and school quality are most 
likely to bias OLS estimates in an upward direction, measurement error 
resulting from individuals misreporting their educational attainment will, in 
most cases, bias results downwards.  Using data on identical twins 
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) find that that measurement error in reported 
schooling biases results downwards significantly.  Card (1999) finds that the 
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downward bias in conventional Mincerian schooling coefficients due to 
measurement error is probably on the order of 10%.  When family 
background effects are controlled for, the bias is more likely to be in the 
region of 15%.  Recent work by Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999) however 
cautions about the implications of measurement error when the measurement 
error is non-classical.  This might occur as those with the lowest level of 
schooling cannot underreport and those at the highest level cannot over-
report their educational attainment.  They find that those with completed 
college education have a higher probability of reporting schooling levels 
correctly than those with less than completed college and that OLS estimates 
of the returns to education will tend to be understated for incomplete college 
and overstated for college completion.   
 
We know little of the true extent of these potential biases in the returns to 
education in South African owing to lack of reliable data.  However, if the 
emerging consensus in richer countries is anything to go by, we might 
expect these various forms of bias to have little net effect, if not on the 
estimated rates of return, then on the generalised convex nature of the 
relationship between education and earnings.  Indeed, Griliches (1977) finds 
that the biases resulting from measurement error and omitted variables 
appear to offset each other.  Likewise, Deardon (1999) finds that the effects 
of measurement error and self-selection biases almost directly offset the 
impact of omitted ability and family background bias.  Likewise, the 
available evidence on the effects of ability suggests little impact on the 





Contrary to the assumptions of conventional human capital theory, the 
weight of the available evidence (old and new) for South Africa, indicates, a 
strong convex relationship between education and earnings, the implication 
being that rates of returns to schooling increase with the level of education 
attained.  The discontinuity found in the large gap in the returns between 
primary and higher education, could even be described as non-convex.   
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While our purpose in this paper is not to venture an explanation of this 
phenomenon, two points concerning interpretation are worth mentioning.  
First, other work shows that a substantial part of the apparent convexity is 
attributable to racial differences in the nature of the returns to education, 
with striking changes having taken place over the last decade concerning in 
the manner in which the labour market rewards blacks and whites with 
similar levels of attainment.  Specifically, the rate of return to African 
education has remained unchanged in the decade since the end of Apartheid, 
but that of White education has witnessed a sharp increase, and no longer 
displays the convex pattern observed in the aggregate data.  In short, the 
education of Whites, it would appear, is now equally rewarded by level of 
education, while the reward structure for blacks remains locked in a sharply 
convex (and thus unequal) pattern (Keswell, 2003). 
 
Second, in the non-linear (read non-Mincerian) approach to estimating the 
rate of return, including the unemployed in the analysis serves to lower 
returns at the levels of education for which the highest proportions of the 
unemployed are found.  The major fraction of surplus labour in South Africa 
is found amongst those who have relatively low levels of education, thus 
contributing to the strong form of convexity observed. 
 
The pattern of returns has implications for the incentives driving individuals’ 
human capital investment decisions. Increasing returns on the magnitude 
suggested by the available evidence implies a limited role for publicly 
provided education to have a measurable impact on inequality, especially in 
the presence of borrowing constraints.  Otherwise talented but poor 
individuals might quite rationally decide to drop out of schooling at a very 
low level because the intermediate rewards are so negligible.  The expected 
pattern of the distribution of education would then bifurcate, where previous 
wealth disparities determine who can and cannot acquire the relevant level 
of education that is rewarded, thus leading to persistence in the distribution 
of income and wealth.  Therefore, when the reward structure is convex, 
one’s initial wealth level matters greatly for long run outcomes.  Our 
estimates suggest that the discontinuity assumption necessary for the 
generation of theoretical poverty traps as in Galor and Zeira (1993), 
Ljungqvist (1993), and Mookherjee and Ray (2002) might be a robust 
empirical phenomenon, but even if this were not the case, the robustness of 
the increasing returns found in the reward structure suggests little private 
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incentives for the acquisition of education for the overwhelming majority of 
the labour force.  Given this reward structure, educational reforms on their 
own (especially small interventions) will have a negligible impact on the 
distribution of income, education and wealth, because the convex pattern of 
returns (if robust to various controls for omitted variable bias) implies 
dramatically different incentives for the acquisition of education facing rich 
and poor – those lucky enough (or smart enough) to attain high levels of 
education with little cost (in the broad sense) will  tend to benefit 
enormously from educational reforms (that improve access or quality) and 
will go on and acquire tertiary education and reap the high rewards leaving 
the vast majority behind. If this scenario were true, one implication is that an 
education-led development strategy can only work if pursued in conjunction 
with policies aimed at influencing the way in which the labour market 
rewards such education.  The precise nature of these policies is, of course, 
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Table 1.  The Coefficient on Years of Schooling: Mincerian Rates of Return to Education 













Coefficient  Coefficient 
Sub-Saharan Africa 974 7.3 11.7  5.9 13.4  13 
Latin America/ Caribbean 3 125 8.2 12.0  7.9 12.4  14 
Asia* 5 182 8.4 9.9  8.4 9.6  11 
Europe/ Middle East/ North Africa*  6 299 8.8 7.1  8.5 8.2  8 
OECD  24 582 9.0 7.5  10.9 6.8  9 
World 9 160 8.3 9.7  8.4 10.1  11 
 




* These are for Non-OECD countries. The figures for each region comprise simple unweighted averages compiled from the estimates 
for all countries falling into that region. The specified regions do not represent the same group of countries in each paper.  As more 
country-specific studies have become available, the dataset has increased – the 2002 analysis includes updated estimates on roughly 









Table 2.  Average Private Rate of Return to Education  
  2002  1994  1985 
Region  Primary Secondary Tertiary  Primary Secondary Tertiary  Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Sub-Saharan Africa 37.6 24.6 27.8  41.3 26.6 27.8  45 26 32 
Latin America/ Caribbean 26.6 17.0 19.5  26.2 16.8 19.7  32 23 23 
Asia* 20.0 15.8 18.2  39.0 18.9 19.9  31 15 18 
Europe/ Middle East/ North Africa*  13.8 13.6 18.8  17.4 15.9 21.7  17 13 13 
OECD  13.4 11.3 11.6  21.7 12.4 12.3  N/A 12 12 
World 26.6 17.0 19.0  29.1 18.1 20.3  31 a 18 20 
 




* Figures in tables are percentages. These are for Non-OECD countries. The figures for each region comprise simple unweighted averages 
compiled from the estimates for all countries falling into that region. The specified regions do not represent the same group of countries in each 
paper.  As more country-specific studies have become available, the dataset has increased – the 2002 analysis includes updated estimates on 
roughly half of the 98 countries considered with a much larger sample size than any of the previous reviews.  These studies are not directly 
comparable with Mincerian returns as they are calculated according to the extended cost benefit method.  Moreover, the rate of return cannot be 
read as the marginal increase to an additional year of education as is the case in the Mincerian model.  Rather, it is to be interpreted as the rate 
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Table 3. Average Social Rates of Returns to Education (calculated according to the “full method”) 
 2002  1994  1985 Region 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary  Primary Secondary Tertiary  Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Sub-Saharan Africa 25.4 18.4 11.3  24.3 18.2 11.2  26 17 13 
Latin America/ Caribbean 17.4 12.9 12.3  17.9 12.8 12.3  26 18 16 
Asia* 16.2 11.1 11.0  19.9 13.3 11.7  27 15 13 
Europe/ Middle East/ North Africa*  15.6 9.7 9.9  15.5 11.2 10.6  13 10 8 
OECD  8.5 9.4 8.5  14.4 10.2 8.7  N/A 11 9 
World 18.9 13.1 10.8  18.4 13.1 10.9  23a 14 12 
 




* Figures in tables are percentages. These are for Non-OECD countries. The figures for each region comprise simple unweighted averages 
compiled from the estimates for all countries falling into that region. The specified regions do not represent the same group of countries in each 
paper.  As more country-specific studies have become available, the dataset has increased – the 2002 analysis includes updated estimates on 
roughly half of the 98 countries considered with a much larger sample size than any of the previous reviews.  The average rate of return is 
calculated according to the “full method” using the following formula: 









c w r w w r− −
=− =
+ + = − +∑ ∑  
where s = years of schooling, c = the costs incurred in acquiring s years of schooling and w = the earnings foregone in this period.  wS = the 
wages earned by someone with s years of schooling and w0 = the wages earned by someone with 0 years of schooling.  r is the internal rate of 
return to s years of schooling that equates the present value of the costs of s years of schooling with the present value of the benefits for a 
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Table 4.  Rates of Return to Education for South Africa1 
Years of Education 
Study Survey Sample considered 
7 12 15 Mean 
Mwabu and Schultz (2000) PSLSD, 1993 All races and genders2 0.05 0.21 0.37 0.21 
Kingdon and Knight (1999) PSLSD, 1993 All races and genders 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.09 
Erichsen and Wakeford (2001) PSLSD, 1993 All races and genders2 0.04 0.12 0.17 0.11 
Erichsen and Wakeford (2001) PSLSD, 1993 All races (male) 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.13 
Erichsen and Wakeford (2001) OHS, 1995 All races and genders2  0.05 0.12 0.17 0.11 
Erichsen and Wakeford (2001) OHS, 1995 All races (male) 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.13 
Lam (2001) OHS, 1995 All races (male) 0.09 0.25 0.263 0.11 
Rospabe (2001) OHS, 1999 All races and genders2 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.10 
Mean (studies using all races)   0.05 0.15 0.18 0.12 
Michaud and Vencatachellum (2001)  African (male) 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.10 
Moll (1996) CSS/HSRC, 1990 African (male) 0.02 0.11 0.163 0.04 
Moll (1998) PSLSD, 1993 African (male) 0.03 0.09 0.60 0.24 
Hertz PSLSD, 1993 African (both genders)    0.114 




1. To make the reported estimates in each study roughly comparable, the estimates in each study were translated 
into pseudo splines where the relevant thresholds are set at 7 years (primary), 12 years (secondary) and 15+ 
years (tertiary).  The coefficient on the spline measures the average rate of return to an additional year of the 
given level of education.  When the dependent variable is in natural logarithm form, the marginal effect is 
computed by taking the antilog of the spline coefficient minus 1 (see Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980)).  For 
studies that attempt to capture non-linearities by specifying dummy variables for each year of education, the 
marginal effect is calculated by subtracting the coefficient of a given year from the coefficient of the previous or 
following year.  The average rate of return from, for example, 8 years to 10 years is calculated by subtracting the 
coefficient on the 8 year dummy from that on the 10 year dummy and then dividing by the difference, in this 
case 2. For studies that introduce higher order polynomials in education, the marginal rate of return is simply the 
derivative with respect to schooling evaluated at the relevant level of schooling. In all cases, once the marginal 
returns are calculated they are then averaged for primary, secondary and tertiary levels to calculate the pseudo 
spline.   
2. The reported coefficients in these studies apply to sub-samples so coefficients are first weighted by their relevant 
sample proportions before applying the relevant marginal effect calculation.  
3. The use of dummy variables to capture non-linearities complicates the calculation of marginal returns to tertiary 
education.  Since tertiary education varies in length of study and qualification, one needs to make assumptions 
about the number of years spent in acquiring a diploma or degree.  Two estimates were calculated – one based 
on the assumption that average length to completion of a course of study at the tertiary level is 3 years, and 
another based on the assumption of 2 years. The figure reported in the table is the average of the two estimates 
4. The construction of the pseudo spline was not possible in this case.  The estimates are not directly comparable 
because included are zero values for the unemployed and the relevant equations are estimated in levels as 
opposed to the usual log-linear form.   
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Table 5.  Mean Sample Characteristics of Surveys Used 
 









Sample Size 8495 31777 30956 29949 N/A 
African 76.14 70.22 79.61 79.76 72 
Coloured 10.18 14.70 14.32 12.48 11 
Indian 3.64 3.71 1.84 2.16 3 
White 10.04 11.37 4.23 5.60 14 
Male 52.48 56.06 49.44 49.51 54 
Female 47.52 43.94 50.56 50.49 46 
Rural 77.93 42.74 44.07 39.07 36 
Urban 22.07 57.26 55.93 60.93 64 
Non-Unionised Full Time Wage Earners 71.2 67.59 62.14 60.97 N/A 
Unionised Full Time Wage Earners 28.8 32.41 37.86 39.03 N/A 
Mean Age 32.88 34.90 34.07 34.18 N/A 
 (11.10) (11.09) (10.63) (11.16) N/A 
Mean Age of Censored Sample 30.12 31.25 31.34 30.56 N/A 
 (10.64) (10.31) (9.96) (10.33) N/A 
Mean Age of Full Time Wage Earners 35.70 37.41 37.19 38.52 N/A 
 (10.85) (10.90) (10.51) (10.54) N/A 
Mean Educational Attainment 7.58 8.23 7.82 8.50 N/A 
 (3.99) (3.99) (3.97) (3.81) N/A 
Mean Education of Censored Observations 7.07 7.66 7.70 8.42 N/A 
 (3.72) (3.75) (3.78) (3.54) N/A 
Mean Education of Full Time Wage Earners 8.10 8.62 7.94 8.60 N/A 
 (4.19) (4.09) (4.17) (4.10) N/A 
Censored 50.58 40.68 53.26 54.52 N/A 
Employed 49.42 59.32 46.74 45.48 N/A 
Mean Earnings/Month of Full Time Wage Earners 1723.46 1934.35 1632.10 2443.86 N/A 
 (3464.60) (2231.36) (1734.08) (3567.08) N/A 
Mean Log Earnings/Month of Full Time Wage Earners 6.87 7.08 6.93 7.28 N/A 
 (1.12) (1.04) (1.03) (1.04) N/A 




The ‘Actual EAP’ statistics are the average proportions by race, gender and location of the economically 
active population calculated by averaging these proportions over the 4 surveys.  They therefore indicate the 
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Table 6.  Returns to Education (Ordinary Least Squares Estimates) 
Equation 5 (Standard Mincer Model) Variable 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant -5.713 * (0.32) -5.751 * (0.18) -4.923 * (0.20) -7.546 * (0.18) 
Age  0.339 * (0.02) 0.336 * (0.01) 0.292 * (0.01) 0.399 * (0.01) 
Age2 -0.003 * (0.00) -0.003 * (0.01) -0.002 * (0.00) -0.003 * (0.00) 
Education 0.245 * (0.01) 0.263 * (0.01) 0.171 * (0.01) 0.202 * (0.01) 
n   8487  31777  30956  29949  
R2  0.162   0.180   0.121   0.192  
 
 
Table 7.  Returns to Education (Tobit Estimates – Marginal Effects) 
Equation 5 (Standard Mincer Equation) Variable 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant -9.750 * (0.38) -9.588 * (0.22) -9.190 * (0.24) -12.87 * (0.22) 
Age  0.407 * (0.02) 0.409 * (0.01) 0.366 * (0.01) 0.517 * (0.01) 
Age2 -0.004 * (0.00) -0.004 * (0.00) -0.003 * (0.00) -0.005 * (0.00) 
Education 0.232 * (0.01) 0.265 * (0.01) 0.152 * (0.01) 0.182 * (0.01) 
n 8487    31777    30956     29949  




An asterisk indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  Double and triples asterisks indicate 5 percent and 10 
percent levels of significance respectively.  The dependant variable is the natural log of earnings.  The reported 
coefficients in table 7 are the marginal effects.  The full set of estimated parameters, including the index values 
and associated standard errors are not reported here but are available on request.  The technical details 
surrounding the estimates in table 7 are outline in appendix E.  The reported estimates are marginal effects of 
the Tobit estimator, computed by writing the mathematical expectation as follows: 
 ( )
( )( ) '
( )
z




   = − +     Φ ∫   
where φ and Φ are the probability density functions and cumulative distribution functions of the standard 
normal distribution respectively and the last term in square brackets is the Tobit correction.  This model has the 
feature of being non-linear both in the variables (as is the case in equations (5), (6) and (9)) as well as in the 
parameters.  In the case of a left-censored dependant variable, the marginal effect of the jth explanatory 
variable (of the vector x) is simply the Tobit index value multiplied by the cumulative distribution function of 
the standard normal distribution evaluated at the sample mean of z (which is simply the standardized value of 
the jth explanatory variable).  Thus the coefficients reported in tables 7, 9, and 11 are to be interpreted in the 
same way as those reported in tables 6, 8, and 10, and are arrived at by calculating: 
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Table 8.  Returns to Education (Ordinary Least Squares Estimates) 
Equation 6 (Non-linear Model – Quadratic Education) Variable 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant -4.524 * (0.32) -4.591 * (0.18) -4.16 * (0.20) -6.291 * (0.18) 
Age  0.340 * (0.02) 0.336 * (0.01) 0.292 * (0.01) 0.393 * (0.01) 
Age2 -0.003 * (0.00) -0.003 * (0.00) -0.002 * (0.00) -0.003 * (0.00) 
Education -0.273 * (0.03) -0.210 * (0.02) -0.177 * (0.02) -0.206 * (0.02) 
Education2 0.039 * (0.00) 0.034 * (0.00) 0.026 * (0.00) 0.028 * (0.00) 
R2 0.196  0.206  0.136    0.207  
n 8495    31777    30956   29949  
 
Table 9.  Returns to Education (Tobit Estimates – Marginal Effects) 
Equation 6 (Non-linear Model – Quadratic Education) Variable 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant -8.573 * (0.38) -8.390 * (0.22) -8.449 * (0.24) -11.727 * (0.22) 
Age  0.409 * (0.02) 0.411 * (0.01) 0.367 * (0.01) 0.513 * (0.01) 
Age2 -0.004 * (0.00) -0.004 * (0.00) -0.003 * (0.00) -0.005 * (0.00) 
Education -0.270 * (0.03) -0.218 * (0.02) -0.179 * (0.02) -0.192 * (0.02) 
Education2 0.037 * (0.00) 0.034 * (0.00) 0.025 * (0.00) 0.025 * (0.00) 
n   8495    31777    30956   29949  




An asterisk indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  Double and triples asterisks indicate 5 percent and 10 
percent levels of significance respectively.  The dependant variable is the natural log of earnings.  The reported 
coefficients in table 9 are the marginal effects.  The full set of estimated parameters, including the index values 
and associated standard errors are not reported here but are available on request.  The technical details 
surrounding the estimates in table 9 are outline in appendix E.  The reported estimates are marginal effects of 
the Tobit estimator, computed by writing the mathematical expectation as follows: 
 ( )
( )( ) '
( )
z




   = − +     Φ ∫   
where φ and Φ are the probability density functions and cumulative distribution functions of the standard 
normal distribution respectively and the last term in square brackets is the Tobit correction.  This model has the 
feature of being non-linear both in the variables (as is the case in equations (5), (6) and (9)) as well as in the 
parameters.  In the case of a left-censored dependant variable, the marginal effect of the jth explanatory 
variable (of the vector x) is simply the Tobit index value multiplied by the cumulative distribution function of 
the standard normal distribution evaluated at the sample mean of z (which is simply the standardized value of 
the jth explanatory variable).  Thus the coefficients reported in tables 7, 9, and 11 are to be interpreted in the 
same way as those reported in tables 6, 8, and 10, and are arrived at by calculating: 
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Table 10.  Returns to Education (Ordinary Least Squares Estimates) 
Equation 9 (Non-Linear Model – Cubic Education) Variable 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant 1.091 * (0.41)   0.56 ** (0.24) 1.019 * (0.26)  -0.021 (0.29) 
Age 0.208 * (0.02)   0.25 * (0.01) 0.174 * (0.01)  0.238 * (0.01) 
Age2 -0.002 * (0.00) -0.00 * (0.00) -0.002 * (0.00) -0.002 * (0.00) 
Female -0.545 * (0.06) -1.36 * (0.03) -0.837 * (0.03) -0.682 * (0.03) 
African -3.165 * (0.11) -2.50 * (0.06) -2.293 * (0.08) -2.597 * (0.07) 
Coloured -2.117 * (0.15) -1.26 * (0.07) -1.186 * (0.10) -1.504 * (0.09) 
Indian -0.894 * (0.19) -0.54 * (0.09)  -0.206 (0.14) -0.622 * (0.13) 
Education  0.220 (0.17)  0.84 * (0.10) 0.547 * (0.10)  0.485 * (0.11) 
Education2 -0.089 * (0.03) -0.19 * (0.02) -0.130 * (0.02) -0.106 * (0.02) 
Education3 0.006 * (0.00)  0.01 * (0.00) 0.007 * (0.00)  0.005 * (0.00) 
Age* Education  -0.005 (0.00) -0.02 * (0.00) -0.015 * (0.00) -0.011 * (0.00) 
Age* Education2 0.002 * (0.00)  0.00 * (0.00) 0.003 * (0.00)  0.002 * (0.00) 
Age* Education3 0.000 * (0.00)    0.00 * (0.00) 0.000 * (0.00)  0.000 * (0.00) 
Union Member 3.232 * (0.09)  3.04 * (0.04) 4.033 * (0.04)  4.324 * (0.04) 
Western Cape Province 1.132 * (0.14)   -0.04 (0.07) 0.920 * (0.07)  0.408 * (0.07) 
Eastern Cape Province -0.349 * (0.11)  -1.07 * (0.06) -0.800 * (0.06) -0.924 * (0.06) 
Northern Cape Province 0.007 (0.26)  -0.59 * (0.09) 0.416 * (0.09) -0.17 *** (0.09) 
Free State Province -1.024 * (0.17)  -0.24 * (0.06) 0.437 (0.06) -0.340 * (0.07) 
KwaZulu-Natal Province 0.009 (0.10)  -0.36 * (0.06)   -0.493 (0.05) -0.402 * (0.05) 
Northwest Province 1.038 * (0.11)   -0.27 * (0.07)    0.032 (0.06) -0.388 * (0.06) 
Mpumulanga Province 1.181 * (0.12)   -0.37 * (0.06) 0.332 * (0.06) -0.520 * (0.07) 
Northern Province 0.101 (0.12)   -0.87 * (0.07)  -0.096 (0.06) -0.785 * (0.06) 
n 8487   31777   30956  29949  




An asterisk indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  Double and triples asterisks indicate 5 percent and 10 
percent levels of significance respectively.  The dependant variable is the natural log of earnings.  All variables 
are binary except for age and education.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Given the non-linearity of the 
schooling term, and its interaction with the age variable, the rate of return to education (as in the case of tables 
8 and 9) are not obvious from the above parameter estimates.  These are computed according to equation (9) 
and reported in the top panel of table 12. 
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Table 11.  Returns to Education (Tobit Estimates- Marginal Effects) 
 Equation 9 (Non-Linear Model – Cubic Education) 
 1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant -2.9270 * (0.51) -3.037 * (0.32) -3.060 * (0.32) -5.187 * (0.36) 
Age  0.2750 * (0.02) 0.328 * (0.01) 0.238 * (0.01) 0.344 * (0.01) 
Age2 -0.0030 * (0.00) -0.003 * (0.00) -0.002 * (0.00) -0.003 * (0.00) 
Female -0.5770 * (0.07) -1.716 * (0.04) -0.918 * (0.04) -0.758 * (0.03) 
African -2.8380 * (0.13) -2.571 * (0.07) -2.019 * (0.09) -2.243 * (0.08) 
Coloured -1.6420 * (0.17) -1.079 * (0.08) -0.785 * (0.10) -1.048 * (0.10) 
Indian -0.5390 ** (0.21) -0.434 * (0.11) 0.188 (0.15) -0.365 * (0.14) 
Education  -0.0650 (0.21) 0.929 * (0.13) 0.595 * (0.12) 0.442 * (0.13) 
Education2 -0.0500 (0.04) -0.215 * (0.02) -0.150 * (0.02) -0.107 * (0.02) 
Education3 0.0050 ** (0.00) 0.012 * (0.00) 0.008 * (0.00) 0.006 * (0.00) 
Age* Education   0.0010 (0.01)  -0.024 (0.00) -0.017 * (0.00) -0.011 * (0.00) 
Age* Education2   0.0010 (0.00) 0.005 * (0.00) 0.004 * (0.00) 0.002 * (0.00) 
Age* Education3   0.0000 *** (0.00) 0.000 * (0.00) 0.000 * (0.00) 0.000 * (0.00) 
Union Member   2.9060 * (0.09) 3.140 * (0.05) 3.436 * (0.05) 3.545 * (0.50) 
Western Cape Province   1.1310 * (0.16) 0.019 (0.08) 0.942 * (0.08) 0.393 * (0.08) 
Eastern Cape Province  -0.5590 * (0.14) -1.281 * (0.07) -1.019 * (0.08) -1.115 * (0.07) 
Northern Cape Province   0.0480 (0.31) -0.598 * (0.11) 0.518 * (0.10) -0.083 * (0.10) 
Free State Province  -1.8790 * (0.25)  -0.086 (0.08) 0.584 * (0.07) -0.292 * (0.08) 
KwaZulu-Natal Province   0.0570 (0.13)  -0.396 (0.07) -0.672 * (0.07) -0.453 * (0.06) 
Northwest Province   1.2330 * (0.14)  -0.258 * (0.08) 0.066 (0.07) -0.424 * (0.07) 
Mpumulanga Province   1.3760 * (0.14) -0.406 * (0.08) 0.423 * (0.07) -0.597 * (0.08) 
Northern Province   0.1160 (0.14) -1.075 * (0.09)    -0.06 (0.08) -0.947 * (0.08) 
n 8487  31777  30956  29949  
Log likelihood -14985  -62975  -53247  -50255  
 
Notes 
An asterisk indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  Double and triples asterisks indicate 5 
percent and 10 percent levels of significance respectively.  The dependant variable is the natural 
log of earnings.  All variables are binary except for age and education.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  The model is both non-linear in the variables (as in table 10), but also non-linear in 
the parameters.  Thus, in order to arrive at estimates of the rate of return to education, we first find 
the marginal effects of the variables in the model as outlined in the note to table 9 (the full set of 
estimated parameters, including the index values and associated standard errors are not reported 
here but are available on request). This calculation gives the coefficients reported in table 11 and is 
to be interpreted in the same way as those reported in table 10.  But given the non-linearity 
introduced through the schooling term and its interaction with the age variable, the rates of return 
to education are not obvious from the above marginal effects.  In order to arrive at these estimates, 
we first apply equation (9) to the above coefficients. The results are reported in the bottom panel in 
table 12.   
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Table 12.  Returns to Education (Non-Linear Models)  
1993 1995 1997 2000 Years of Schooling 
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
 
Based on Equation 6 (Non-linear Model – Quadratic Education) 
 
7 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.16 
10 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.31 
12 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.45 0.42 0.47 0.41 
15 0.90 0.84 0.81 0.80 0.60 0.57 0.63 0.56 
1 – 7 (Average) 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
8 – 12 (Average) 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.31 
13 – 15 (Average) 0.82 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.55 0.52 0.58 0.51 
 
Based on Equation 9 (Non-linear Model – Cubic Education) 
 
7 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
10 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.14 
12 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.53 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.32 
15 0.80 0.89 0.85 1.05 0.65 0.76 0.54 0.61 
3 – 7 (Average) 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 
8 – 12 (Average) 0.29 0.28 0.28  0.30  0.21  0.20  0.16  0.15 




The top panel shows the coefficients (marginal effects) of tables 8 and 9 evaluated at various levels of education, 
according to equation (7).  The bottom panel does the same utilising the coefficients from tables 9 and 10, and 
the formula given by equation (9).  The “average effects” in both panels are calculated by averaging the 
marginal effects for each year of the relevant education span.  For example, the 8-12 average for the 2000 
estimate based on the Tobit model given in the bottom panel is calculated by finding the rates of return to each 
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Appendix A:  Summary of Recent South African Return to Schooling Literature  
 














Primary 0.084 * 0.062 * -0.012 -0.034 
Secondary 0.158 * 0.249 * 0.084 * 0.052 * 
Tertiary 0.294 * 0.396 * 0.151 * 0.139 * 
Mwabu and Schultz (2000) 
(PSLSD 1993) 






log gross hourly 
wage 
rural dummy, experience, 
experience2 
 







included here) N 9325 10473 1447 1517 










Primary -0.022 * 0.031 -0.031 * -0.052 * 
Secondary 0.039 * 0.032 0.086 * -0.051 * 
Tertiary 0.446 * 0.422 * 0.764 * 0.636 * Multinomial 
logit N 19920 18913 
Primary 0.027 * 0.030 *   
Secondary 0.091 * 0.111 *   






Dichotomous:    
0 = unemployed 
1 = employed  
2 = self – emp.   
race dummies, age, age2, no 
of kids, urban dummy, 
marital status dummy, family 
members’ employment status 
dummies, household head 
dummy, distance from phone, 
province dummies 
 
Education variable:  
Spline Function Interval 
regression N 9913 7651   










Primary 0.037 * 0.010 0.039 * -0.074 
Secondary 0.122 * -0.004 0.128 * 0.137 * 










gender, province ,sector,  
union (all dummies), 
experience, experience2, 
urban dummy,  log hours 
worked per month 
 





race) N 2663 2536 7396 3179 




African   
Female   
Primary 0.046 * 0.013   
Continuous:  
log gross hourly 
wage Secondary 0.116 * 0.073 *   
Tertiary 0.114 * 0.055   
OLS N 2361 1525   

















Primary 0.042 * -0.007 0.013 -0.066 * 
Secondary 0.114 * 0.055 * 0.052 * 0.092 * 














professional sector dummy, 
urban dummy, province 
dummies, union dummy 
 




Step n 1571 791 1208 317 
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Appendix A: Summary of Recent South African Return to Schooling Literature (Cont.) 
 




Broad UE Narrow UE             Sample 
Education African male African  female African male African female 
Primary 0.003 * 0.003 0.004 * 0.003 
Secondary 0.005 * 0.052 * 0.016 * 0.057 * 
Tertiary 0.003 -0.023 0.016 * 0.011 * 
participation 
age dummies, urban dummy, 
household structure variables, 
household income 
 





effects) n 15658 19548 15658 19548 
Primary -0.012 * -0.004 * -0.009 * -0.009 * 
Secondary 0.010 0.036 * 0.000 -0.021 * 




age dummies, urban dummy, 
province dummies 
 





effects) n 14203 12810 11931 9426 
Primary 0.035 * 0.049 * 0.036 * 0.051 * 
Secondary 0.109 * 0.082 * 0.108 * 0.093 * 
Tertiary 0.037 0.023 0.031 0.032 * 






Urban dummies, province 
dummies, industrial sector 
dummies, occupation 
dummies, experience, 




likelihood n 14124 12723 11886 9393 
Education Males Education Males  
1-3 yrs -0.010 8 0.571 *  
4 0.090 * 9 0.733 *  
5 0.150 * 10 0.968 *  
6 0.269 * 11 1.041 *  
7 0.397 * 12 1.484 *  
  >=15 1.970 *  





log gross  
monthly 
earnings 
race dummies, age, age2 
 
Education variable:  
Dummies for each year  
OLS 
n 10867    
Education Males Education Males  
0 -0.140 * 8 0.068 *  
1-3 yrs -0.170 * 9 0.120 *  
4 -0.110 * 10 0.210 *  
5 -0.075 * 11 0.340 *  
6 -0.088 * 12 0.540 *  










log of gross  
annual cash 
Income 
experience, experience2,  
married, region dummies OLS 
  Degree 0.480 *  
            Sample 
Education African male    
Primary 0.03 *    
Secondary 0.09 *    








literacy test  
Log of hourly 
wage 
Urban dummy, gender 
dummy, experience, 
experience , experiance2, test 
score index. 
OLS  
n 133    
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Appendix A: Summary of Recent South African Return to Schooling Literature (Cont.) 
 




            Sample 
Education 
Formal non-
union Formal union   
primary 0.175 * 0.140 *   
std8 0.326 * 0.247 *   
matric 0.507 * 0.470 *   
dip (no mat) 0.486 * 0.623 *   
dip (with mat) 0.957 * 0.841 *   







log gross hourly 
wage 
urban, rural, industrial sector, 
occupation, single, not 
household head, experience, 






n 3039 2720   
            Sample 
Education 1993 male 1995 male 1993 female 1995 female 
Years -0.004 -0.005 -0.01 0.026 * 
Years2 0.007 * 0.007 * 0.005 * 0.004 * 
Erichsen & Wakeford 
(2001) 










union, industrial sector, 
occupation, province 
OLS 
n 2223 11727 1570 6396 
             Sample Education 
All races & 





Log of gross 
hourly wage 
experience, experience2, race, 
gender, union, urban, 
province, married, occupation, 
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Appendix B: Non-reporting of Income 
 
A potential problem exists with regards the reliability of the reported income data in the October 
Household Surveys, especially in the most recent surveys, since respondents were given the 
option of reporting only their income bracket as opposed to their actual income.  Percentage-wise, 
the number who reported their actual income in 1997, 1998 and 1999 is relatively low.  However, 
if it could be established that those who reported actual earnings is a random sample of those who 
could have reported actual earnings, then using only the reported data even if the sample is 
relatively small, would be of no consequence to the question we address in this paper.  If this 
were not to be the case however, such that the pattern of non-reporting was systematically related 
to some other observable characteristic of the data, then  using only the actual data would result in 
biased estimates as the assumption that income is log normally distributed would be violated.  
Thus far, the only other approach to dealing with this problem in the literature is to use the 
midpoints of the intervals reported (see for example Hofmeyer (2001) and Rospabe (2001)).  This 
approach is incorrect for technical reasons given the peculiar nature of censored data, but even if 
this were not the case, changes in the definition of income catagories, particularly between the 
1995 survey and subsequent years complicates matters given that one of our objectives is to 
compare estimates across surveys.  Rather, we adopt a different approach that makes use of both 
simulated and empirical versions of the earnings distributions under question. We explain and 
demonstrate below how we tested for randomness of reported earnings in each of the OHS 
datasets. 
 
The samples of interest are all those classified as employed according to our definition, who have 
reported earnings, either as an actual amount or as falling into a specified earnings bracket.  The 
first step was to create an earnings category variable that reflected the appropriate earnings 
interval for all individuals under consideration (including those who reported their actual data).  
Step two involved generating simulated earnings data for each earnings category.  This was 
achieved by using a random number generator to sample numbers over a uniform distribution 
defined by the relevant intervals.  Sampling was carried out with replacement so as to allow for 
the possibility of clustering.  However, given that we know nothing about the actual clustering 
process, no further manipulations were made to the actual data generating process.   
 
Using the simulated data, we then plotted the implied earnings distributions for each survey year 
using standard density curves that integrate to unity. We did the same for the actual earnings data 
that was reported and then super-imposed onto this, a plot of the distribution of these same 
individuals’ simulated data.  Finally, we plotted the densities of all midpoint data for the full set 
of earnings categories as well as for just those who reported actual earnings data.  Figure 1 shows 
the results for each survey. 
 
We start by comparing the density plots for those who reported actual earnings, with the 
simulated data from constructed earnings categories for this exact group of respondents.  We do 
this to examine how well our simulation rule replicates the true distribution.  We see that for 1995 
and 1997 the simulated data (for those that reported actual data) has the identical shape to the 
simulated data of the entire sample. This suggests that if the data generating process is the same 
among the two catagories of respondents (meaning that any patterns of skewness of the true 
distribution of incomes within intervals (if they exist) is assumed to be the same across both 
groups of respondents), then the true distribution of actual earnings for the full sample is likely to 
be similar to that of the sample of individuals who actually did report their actual earnings.  The 
reverse is true, however, for 1998 and 1999 – i.e., since there is an apparent increase in the 
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divergence in the simulated earnings data of those who bothered to report their actual earnings 
data compared to the simulated earnings data for all individuals in the sample, the actual earnings 
data of the entire sample is likely to have a significantly different distribution that the actual 
earnings data of those who bothered to report such.  This matches very closely with what is 
known about the changes in the frequency of non-reporting over time – indeed, the problem is 
especially acute in the later surveys.  These findings suggests that if one were to treat only 
reported income data as valid earnings observations, then doing so for earlier years in the survey 
poses fewer problems from an econometric standpoint than the later years.  For this reason, we 
use only the 1995 and 1997 samples from the October Household Surveys, along with the PSLSD 
of 1993 and labour force survey of 2000 (which of course are not plagued with these problems) 
 
Finally, notice that across surveys, the density plot that diverges most from the plot of actual 
reported data is the graph constructed from interval midpoints for all individuals.  This is most 
apparent for the 1995 OHS where we see the midpoint distribution is rather arbitrary with quite 
obvious over-representation of wealthier individuals in the process of assigning observations to 
the middle of each relevant category.  The reason the OHS 1995 result is so pronounced is rooted 
in the questionnaire design for this year.   As pointed out earlier, the choice of income categories 
in 1995 differs from the other years in that the lowest category was large (R1-R999 per week, 
month or year) compared to subsequent years where it was broken down into 3 smaller 
categories.  It can be seen quite clearly from our graphs that using midpoint data will not yield 
unbiased results in all cases except for the 1997 survey. 
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Appendix C: Defining Employment and Earnings 
 
The aim of the empirical analysis was to test the same earnings function specification across a 
number of datasets and thereby to verify whether increasing returns are a robust feature of the 
data.  Working with a number of datasets required a careful study of each survey’s 
representativeness.  It also required definitions of variables to be precise and consistent across 
datasets.   
 
In the econometric exercise we wished to explore the total effect of education on individuals’ 
economic outcomes.  We therefore include the unemployed in the analysis in order to account for 
the impact of education on both the probability of finding full time employment and on earnings 
given that one is employed.  As the unemployed are included, it was necessary to define the 
economically active population and therefore choose whether to use the broad or narrow 
definitions of unemployment.  A growing literature on the extent of ‘discouraged workers’ and 
the greater suitability of using the expanded definition when examining the jobless in a South 
African context informed our choice here (see Kingdon and & Knight (1999, 2000); Natrass 
(2000); Wittenburg(1999); Dinkelman & Pirouz (2002)).  
 
Although we use a broad classification for the unemployed, we use a ‘narrow’ definition for the 
employed.  Income earners are restricted to full time wage employees from age 15.    The main 
reason for using this restricted group is that full time wage employment should represent the least 
variable component in earnings.  Apart from being inconsistently defined across surveys, and 
poorly measured and recorded, self-employment and casual labour is largely characterised by 
highly variable earnings that will often be subject to a large degree of seasonality.  Inclusion of 
these groups has the consequence of confounding issues if large differences are found in rates of 
return between surveys.  Limiting the effects of seasonality and inter-temporal fluctuations of 
incomes due to idiosyncratic shocks (both of which matter greatly in secondary labour markets) 
allows us to say with a greater level of precision whether such differences are due to structural 
features of primary labour markets.   
 
All individuals who were not employed full time therefore did not fit our definition of 
employment and are excluded from the sample of interest.  Our sample is therefore comprised of 
full time waged workers who have positive earnings, and those classified as unemployed, who 
have zero earnings.  The latter do not have paid employment of any kind and includes those 
classified as discouraged work seekers.  Individuals with part time paid employment were also 
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Appendix D:  The Consequences of Omitting the 
Unemployed 
 
Simple Mincerian returns to education are generally calculated using ordinary least squares 
regressions run for all those with positive earnings in the relevant sample.  This, however, can be 
problematic. Random samples of a population of interest are likely to include both earners and 
non-earners.  Excluding non-earners from the regression implies that the sample is no longer 
randomly selected and OLS results will not be truly representative of the population.  
Furthermore, the results will be biased for technical reasons.  Essentially we have a sample 
selection problem in that we have the right hand side variables for all individuals sampled, but 
either a zero for those who are unemployed or positive earnings for those who are employed.  
That is, one can only earn an income, given one is employed.  Thus, our dependent variable is 
said to be left censored at zero.      
 
Writing a standard OLS regression in condensed form: 
 
 'y x uβ= +  (11) 
 









= ∀ ≠= 
 (12) 
.  
If either of these assumptions are violated, then estimates of β will be biased.   
 
When using OLS, one can exclude the unemployed (most studies summarised in appendix A for 
example adopt this approach).  Leaving aside the lack of intuition in doing this in country with 
massive unemployment, there is the econometric issue of discarding information (the zero’s are 
valid observations).  Specifically, considering only those who report positive earnings leads to  
truncation in the sample under consideration.  Thus yi is observed if and only if  yi > 0.  Formally:  
 
 ' 0y x u iff yβ= + >  (13) 
 
Estimating such a model requires one to take the mathematical expectation of (13), which we do 
by using the law of total probabilities, giving: 
 
 ( ) ( 0 ) ( 0, )E y x pr y x E y y x= > >  (14) 
 
















Given the assumption of normality, ( 0 )pr y x> can then be written equivalently as 
   
 ( ' ) ( ' )pr u x pr u xβ β> − = <  (16) 
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which implies that (14) can be simplified as: 
 
 ( ) ( ' ) ( 0, )E y x pr u x E y y xβ= < >  (17) 
 
 ( )( ) ( ' ) ' ( ' )E y x pr u x x E u u xβ β β= < + >  (18) 
 
To estimate equation (18), using ordinary least squares, it is required that 
 
 ( )' 0i i iE u u x β> − =  (19) 
 
This cannot be true if (12) holds.  Therefore, equation (18) is a biased estimator of the underlying 
relationship modelled in (13).  
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A key challenge to estimating standard earnings functions based on household surveys is finding 
an appropriate method for dealing with zero earners. The econometric literature is divided on 
precisely how to deal with this issue (see Madalla (1983) and Deaton (1997) for opposing views).  
However, the practice of simply treating zeros as missing values (which all except one of 
reviewed studies does) results in biased estimates.  Moreover including the zeros and not 
adjusting the estimator used can have consequences, especially if the goal is to compare estimates 
across surveys where the degree of censoring differs substantially. Since the degree of censoring 
in the 1995 OHS differs by a magnitude of 10-15% compared to the other surveys, the cross-
sectional comparisons made in this paper depends crucially on a systematic treatment of this 
problem.   
 
To correct for this potential bias, we utilize a Tobit regression framework. In condensed form, we 
can represent the model (whether we are dealing with equations (4), (5), (6) or (9)) equivalently 
as  
 
 'y x uβ= +  (20) 
 
If the dependant variable is left censored at zero (meaning a sizable fraction of the observations 







   0,       0
   0,       
y x u
if y then y






Note that the dependent variable is latent (indicated by the star), since only reported earnings are 
observed. 
 
Since the Tobit estimator is non-linear in the parameters, we use the technique of maximum 
likelihood estimation.  In short, the approach approximates the most likely data generating 
process – i.e., the parameter values in (4), (5), (6), or (9) mostly likely to have generated the 
observed data.  Thus, we write out the likelihood (denoted by L) of the observing the given data, 




1 i iL = −Φ Φ∏  (22) 
 
Focusing on the second term of (22), the likelihood of sampling a non-zero observation can be 
represented as the joint density of the error terms.  If the errors are characterised by the standard 









   = = −    
 (23) 
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The likelihood of observing the full set of non-zero outcomes is then the joint density of the 
errors, given by,  
 ( ) ( ) ( )}{2 22 21 '2 exp 2
nn iy xL βπ σ
σ
−− −= − ∑  (24) 
 
Given the exponential term contained in (24), it is useful to take the natural logarithm.  The 
problem of finding the parameter vector most likely to have generated the observed data, then 
reduces to a problem of maximising the log of the likelihood function which, utilising (24) and 




log log 1 logi iL = −Φ + Φ∑ ∑  (25) 




1 1log log 1 log '
22
iL y x βσπσ
 = −Φ + − −  ∑ ∑ ∑  (26) 
 
 ( ) ( )1 22
0
2log log 1 ln ln2 ( ' )
2 2i
nL y xσ π β
σ
= −Φ − + − Σ −∑  (27) 
 
As is well know, the normal equations corresponding to this problem do not have closed form 
solutions owing to the presence of the censored observations represented by the first part of the 
log-likelihood function.  We therefore have to rely on numerical methods of finding the 
maximum of the log-likelihood function.  In all cases, the algorithm used is that of Newton-
Raphson, with the usual Olsen (1978) transformation.   
 
What distinguishes the Tobit estimator from the OLS estimator is that in the case of the former, 
we account for the likely bias introduced by the zero observations. Taking the mathematical 
expectation of (21) produces 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )






' ( ' )
( )'
( )
( )( ) '
( )
z
E y x y x E y y x
u x E y y x
E x u












= > − >
= Φ − +
= Φ − + > −
   = Φ − +     Φ 
   = − +     Φ ∫
 (28) 
 
where φ and Φ are the probability density functions and cumulative distribution functions of the 
standard normal distribution respectively and the last term in square brackets is the Tobit 
correction factor.  An intuitive approximation to Φ in many studies is one minus the fraction of 
the censored sample.  
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This model has feature of being non-linear both in the variables (as is the case in (5), (6) and (9)) 
as well as in the parameters.  Estimating (28) gives the Tobit index values, but because the model 
is non-linear in the parameters, the parameter estimates recovered from (28) are not directly 
comparable to standard OLS estimates of the same relationship.  To achieve this comparison, we 
have to find the marginal effects of the variables in the model.  In the case of a left-censored 
dependant variable, the marginal effect of the jth explanatory variable of the vector x is simply 
the Tobit index value multiplied by the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution evaluated at the sample mean of z (which is simply the standardized value of the jth 
explanatory variable).  In other words,  
 
 








The coefficient reported as the Tobit estimates of the returns to education are therefore calculated 
according to (29) and are comparable to the simple OLS estimates.   
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Figure 1:  Simulated and Actual Earnings Distributions based on the October Household Surveys (see Appendix B) 


































The vertical axis is log of predicted earnings, controlling for age (quadratic), gender, race, years of 
education (cubic), location, age-education interactions, remoteness, and regional fixed effects.  The fitted 
values were generated using the Tobit estimator, to control for bias introduced through conditioning on 
whether an individual reported non-zero earnings.  The pictures show a locally weighted fit from the 
underlying regression (as opposed to the average fit) against years of reported education, in order purge the 
























OHS, 1997 - Controlling for experience
















LFS, 2000 - Controlling for experience
5 years
 




The figures show each individual’s predicted earnings plotted against their corresponding educational 
attainment (as in figure 2) but conditioned further on “potential experience” which is calculated according 
to the formula: age – years of education – 6 (Mincer’s (1974)).  The same patterns shown above also hold 
for the PSLSD and OHS (1995) data. 
 
